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ABSTRACT
As a public good, the environment has traditionally been handled by public authorities. However, with 
globalization conventional state environmental authority is transformed, relocated and deterritorialized. 
New non-state environmental authorities emerge. This paper conceptualizes the shifts in and relocation of 
environmental authority structures and illustrates this with examples from the fields of certification and 
labeling and environmental partnerships. While relocation does take place, new environmental authority 
structures are often mixes of state and non-state authorities. The paper finally assesses these develop-
ments, reflecting on the conventional criticism of the poor environmental and democratic potentials of 
such new non-state environmental authorities.
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RESUMO
Como um bem público, o meio ambiente tem sido tradicionalmente controlado pelo poder público. 
Contudo, com a globalização, a autoridade convencional do Estado em lidar com as questões ambientais 
é transformada, transferida e desterritorializada. Novas autoridades ambientais não estatais emergem. 
Este artigo conceitua as mudanças e relocações nas estruturas do poder ligado às questões ambientais, 
ilustrando com exemplos dos campos da certificação e rotulagem e parcerias ambientais. Enquanto 
ocorre essa relocação, novas estruturas de poder ambiental se formam da mescla de autoridades estatais 
e não estatais. Por último, é feita uma avaliação desses desenvolvimentos, ponderando sobre a crítica 
convencional que faz emergir os limitados potenciais democráticos e ambientais dessas novas autori-
dades não estatais.
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Introduction
Environmental authority has traditionally been linked 
to the state and state organizations. The state authority to 
rule and regulate on environmental problems was tight up 
with the conventional framing of environmental goods as 
collective goods, and environmental problems as market 
failures, which could not be dealt with by economic and 
market institutions. Hence, from the 1950s onwards states 
were key in dealing with the growing environmental chal-
lenges that came along with the rapid economic develop-
ment and industrialization in developed countries.
Thus, we saw – and still see in many developing and 
industrializing countries – rapid increases in the capacities 
of state environmental authorities. First, the national envi-
ronmental authorities increased their number of staff and 
budgets during the 1960s, 1970s and most of the 1980s, 
as well as their capacity to regulate via enhanced legal 
frameworks, environmental policies, planning, measures 
and instruments. With that they also increased their con-
trol and enforcement capacity. Second, a similar process 
took place at the decentralized and local state authorities. 
Capacity building, budget increase, and empowerment 
enhanced the authority and power of local environmental 
state organizations. Third, and a little later in time, state 
authorities increasingly got engaged in bi- and multilateral 
environmental accords, enhancing their (collective) author-
ity beyond national borders.
It was only later in the 1980s that this undisputed 
state environmental authority witnessed its first problems. 
Where neo-liberal ideologies and programs of deregulation 
and privatization (such as those in the UK and the US) came 
together with accusations on state failures in environmental 
protection (cf. JÄNICKE, 1986), environmental state authori-
ties were challenged in their up till then ongoing expansion 
of environmental capacity. But a new wave of environmen-
tal concern, fuelled by the Brundtland report (WCED, 1987) 
and the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (1992), prevented a significant set back in 
state environmental authority and capacity in entering the 
last decade of the former Millennium. This decade was 
formative in the building of state environmental authority 
in many of the developing, industrializing and transitional 
countries. Moreover, it witnessed a rapid increase in the 
number of multilateral environmental agreements being 
negotiated, concluded and ratified. And in many developed 
nations state environmental authorities stabilized until the 
mid 1990s.
But towards the end of the 1990s state environmen-
tal authorities became seriously challenged. From then 
onwards environmental authorities faced (discussions on) 
budget cuts and staff reductions. It is also around that time 
that state authorities experienced their competences and 
regulatory power being jeopardized, challenged or even 
actually diminished in several respects. And non-state 
actors and arrangements began to opt for replacing states 
in environmental protection. But how should we interpret 
these developments? Is it just the ups and downs of Down’s 
(1972) Issue Attention Cycle of environment? Is it a new 
round of neo-liberal privatization and deregulation, not too 
dissimilar from the one in the 1980s? Are we witnessing 
a fundamental shift in environmental authority, from state 
and politics to other domains and institutions in modern 
society? Or are the geographies and territories over which 
environmental authority has to be executed deterritorial-
izing, making conventional nation-state environmental 
authorities no longer apt for its task? 
If the first two reasons would adequately explain the 
pressure felt by environmental state authorities at the turn 
of the millennium, this pressure would have largely disap-
peared by the end of 2006 when especially climate change 
caused a new boost to the environmental agenda globally. 
But this seems at best only partially the case. Hence, in this 
paper we will explore to what extent there is something 
more fundamental and structural at stake with the pressure 
felt by environmental state authorities (cf. MOL; BUTTEL, 
2002). This paper will start with developing a theoretical 
understanding of authority and its shifts, against the back-
ground of late modernity. Subsequently, it analyses two 
fields of shifting environmental authority, labelling and 
certifications, and environmental partnerships. The final 
section evaluates the degree and nature of environmental 
authority shifts.
Globalization and environmental authority
The foundation of any concept or idea of authority 
today still relates back to Max Weber’s theory of authority 
(WEBER, 1947). Authority is interpreted by Weber as the 
power to command or rule and the duty to obey. But, ac-Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, n. 17, p. 33-46, jan./jun. 2008. Editora UFPR 35
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cording to Weber and many who followed him, authority is 
different from coercive power as it rests on a certain degree 
of voluntary compliance, and it exercises legitimate social 
control through a belief system with shared norms. Thus 
authority is closely bound up with legitimacy: “authority 
represents a fusion of power with legitimate social purpose” 
(RUGGIE, 1982, p. 398). Authority also requires a basic trust 
and a degree of cooperation in the development and insti-
tutionalization of habits, norms, rules, and shared expecta-
tions.1 Weber distinguished three forms of authority: legal 
authority, charismatic authority and traditional authority. 
In modern organizations, bureaucracies and states, legal 
authority through impersonal principles dominates, rather 
than traditional or charismatic authority. Weber’s notion 
of authority has been debated widely (cf. BLAU, 1963), and 
has been understood in its specific historical context of 
early twenty century Europe; but the essence of Weber’s 
interpretation of authority still remains valid. And especially 
the separation of authority from power/coercion, from per-
suasion, and from negotiation is still widely held as useful, 
and applied by most scholars.2
But Weber’s notion and classification of authority has 
also been widened beyond the three conventional categories 
of authority. Guess (2001), for instance defines five forms 
or categories of authority: epistemic authority (related to 
knowledge and expertise), natural authority (which comes 
close to Weber’s charismatic authority), de facto authority 
(which is in fact coercive power), de jure authority (over-
lapping with Weber’s legal/bureaucratic authority) and 
moral authority. Herbst (2003) adds to this the category 
of media-derived authority, which is especially relevant 
in current times of an information society (see also Mol, 
forthcoming, on that). And Hall and Biersteker (2002) in-
clude illicit authority of mafias and mercenaries. But one 
of the main lines in recent debates on authority questions 
especially the idea that authority is very much bound up 
with the public domain.3 Limiting authority to the public 
domain, which is much in line with a Weberian notion of 
authority, would make private authority impossible, by re-
lating the legitimate “right to rule” or authority completely 
to the public sphere. Cutler and colleagues (CUTLER, 1999; 
CUTLER et al., 1999b+c), Hall and Biersteker (2002) and 
Ronit (2001), among others, have argued forcefully that the 
disassociation between authority and private spheres can not 
be maintained. Cutler and colleagues illustrate with much 
empirical and historical detail that private market authority 
has existed for long in various forms (e.g. guilds, cartels, 
business associations, private regimes), mainly meant 
to regulate market interactions and prevent further state 
intervention, both domestically and internationally. Hall 
and Biersteker (2002) further widen the category of private 
market authority with private moral authority, including 
authoritative civil society actors and arrangements in le-
gitimately regulating social practices. 
There seems to be growing consensus around the idea 
that at least since the 1990s private authority is gaining 
ground vis-à-vis public authority. And three explanations 
can be distinguished (cf. CUTLER et al., 1999b) that clarify 
this shift from private market authority to public authority.4 
Strongly based in institutional economics is the explanation 
of higher efficiency and lower transaction costs of private 
market authority above public authority, especially in set-
tings with international transactions where no centralized 
political authority exists. The second explanation relates 
to the powers of the architects of private authority, and the 
power produced through private authority for those who 
rule once it is established. Inequalities and structural advan-
tages enable the construction of private authority structures, 
especially in times and situations where (specific) private 
actors dominate. Thirdly, the increasing importance of pri-
vate authority has been explained from a historical perspec-
tive, where the expansion of markets vis-à-vis states, the 
furthering of globalization and the loss of state sovereignty 
facilitate and enable private authorities, while public author-
1 Institutions differ from authority in that they i) are more comprehensive by including non-authoritative rules and resources; (ii) they do not necessarily involve 
trust, a sense of obligation and legitimacy. But the emergence of authority is preconditioned by the existence of a social institution.
2 For instance, Aykens (2002) uses the Weberian distinction between authority and power for criticizing the retreat of the state as analyzed by Susan Strange (1996). 
Along a similar line Conca (2005, p. 118) makes a sharp distinction between influence and authority in analyzing the role of non-state actors in global environmental 
politics.
3 This is also partly reflected in the philosophical debate on the impossibility to reconcile the autonomy and responsibility of individuals under liberalism and the 
obedience to an authority (cf. FRIEDMAN, 1990). 
4 But there is less consensus on and explanation of a shift from public authority to private moral authority.Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, n. 17, p. 33-46, jan./jun. 2008. Editora UFPR 36
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ity becomes under pressure.5 The three explanations are not 
really mutually exclusive, cannot always be disentangled, 
and strengthen each other in explanatory power. While the 
first two explain why also in previous historical periods 
private authority existed, and why and how actors press 
for or seize private authority, the latter explains why cur-
rently private authority seems to be on the rise. Our interest 
here is especially to what extent and how currently, under 
conditions of globalization, the sources and localizations 
of authority are changing, especially with respect to envi-
ronmental authority. 
Globalization and state authority
There is less and less disagreement among social 
scientists that globalization is fundamentally – rather than 
marginally – reshaping modern society, and not in the least 
the position of the state in that. The general conclusion of 
most globalization scholars is that under conditions of glo-
balization the state is losing sovereignty, governing capacity 
and authority. Arguably, Saskia Sassen’s recent work is most 
relevant to understand the changing state authority in what 
she calls the shift from a nation-state assemblage to a new 
global assemblage.
With her strong basis in the analysis of global finan-
cial markets, Saskia Sassen (1994; 2006) shares the conclu-
sion of many scholars of a growing loss of state authority 
through a destabilization of the nation state system or as-
semblage, but she contradicts several of them in refusing 
to interpret this in terms of the irrelevance of governability, 
the withering away of the state, or the overall devastating 
consequence of a mounting market power. From Sassen’s 
work, three specifications can be derived that are key to an 
improved understanding of the changing nature of authority. 
First, it is not so much the irrelevance of the state but the 
partly replacement of state authority by market authority, 
and the denationalizing of state capacities (through growing 
authorities beneath and beyond the nation-state) that are at 
stake in global modernity. This can be witnessed in five 
modalities (SASSEN, 2006, p. 192ff):
1.  the proliferation of private agents, with their rules 
and norms, to handle domains once exclusive to 
governments;
2.  the marketization of public functions both at the 
national and international level;
3.  the growing influence of private agents in inter-
nationalizing political ruling;
4.  the circulation of private norms and aims through 
the public domain, where they are represented as 
being public;
5.  the shift of public regulatory functions to the 
private sector, where they emerge as private 
services.
Second, even if globalization adds to decreasing state 
capacity and authority via a shift of authority form state to 
market and a deterritorialization of authority, such authority 
must still be shaped, channeled and enabled by institutions 
and networks which are rooted in (the system of) nation 
states. While the flows of global capital seems to become 
independent of place and territory, they are not foot-loose 
and are still (also) based in what Castells (1996/1997) calls 
the space of place: localities where local cultures, local 
networks and local conditions matter in shaping, enabling 
and channeling global networks and flows. Third, while 
overall there is a loss of state authority vis-à-vis market 
authority, this process of diminishing state-powers needs 
to be qualified along two lines. Emphasizing an overall 
loss of state authority should not lose sight of major in-
ternal transformations in authority and their differential 
consequences for various state sectors. Some state sectors 
(e.g. the president, the treasurer) get strengthened through 
globalization, others become weak (representative institu-
tions, agencies). At the same time, we can witness the fact 
that the mounting market authority at several instances is 
activated for governing public goods or the common good. 
Private interest governments and market-based systems of 
standardization, accounting and control can not be invali-
dated from a public good perspective by just referring to 
them being performed by market actors and being framed 
in terms of market authority. 
5 Porter and Ronit (2006, p. 44-46) classify five bodies of literature that tried to capture what they label self-regulation since the 1980s, of which globalization 
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Finally, while Castells’ space of flows strongly resem-
bles the infringements of economic-technological systems 
on lifeworld localities, with only local protest identities as 
marginalized counter-powers, Sassen illustrates and makes 
conceptual space for global networks of local-based NGOs 
that do organize “counter-authority” against the dominat-
ing logic and authority of the market, often referred to as 
private moral authority. Globalization lengthens the distance 
between the state and its citizens – resulting in the shrink-
ing of the welfare state and the elimination of a range of 
citizen entitlements – but it also opens up new spaces for 
informal political actors outside the established political 
system (an insight not too far away from Beck’s category 
of subpolitics). As Van den Burg (2005), Herbst (2003) and 
Mol (forthcoming) have argued, digital technologies and the 
media are very much enabling citizen-consumers – but also 
other actors striving for authority – in this respect.
In conclusion then, for Sassen the destabilization and 
undermining of the nation-state through globalization, does 
not leave the state irrelevant and bereft of all its capabilities, 
nor does it lead to the dissolution of governability. Ulrich 
Beck (2005) seems to be in line with Sassen’s understanding 
of the state, but he develops a stronger focus on the strategic 
actor roles for nation-states under cosmopolitization (and 
his perspective is strongly centered on Europe). Beck asks 
how nation-states can make the necessary transformation 
into cosmopolitan states6, within a cosmopolitan regime 
or a global assemblage? The basic strategy Beck offers is 
simple and radical at the same time. States should ‘free’ 
themselves from being territorially rooted in the “space of 
place” and participate in transnational networks. The present 
“rooted character” of nation-states gives them a compara-
tive disadvantage to transnational, deterritorialized global 
business agents who have “wings” and know how to operate 
in the “space of flows”. State and nation should become 
separated in a similar way as once state and religion became 
separated. The transnational arena provides new opportuni-
ties, authority and power resources for individual states. If 
states continue to cling to their national outlook, other actors 
will be happy to do the job for them: global market actors 
will develop and expand forms of (private) regulation and 
authority that better fit their logic and interests and give 
them maximum room for maneuver vis-à-vis diminishing 
state authority. Private actors will create quasi-states without 
democratic and political legitimacy and in the end succeed 
in realizing a further rolling back of the nation-states in the 
global power game. 
The second element of Beck’s cosmopolitan state 
strategy is the development of a transnational storyline in 
the form of a new transnational ideal, defended sui generic. 
A “common human awareness of the global” (BECK, 2005, 
p. 82) is a necessary component of cosmopolitanism. And 
the making visible, tangible and concrete of worldwide 
risks such as climate change, GMOs, global market risks, 
does contribute substantively to this awareness raising job. 
But Beck seems to rely very strong on the educational, 
dramaturgic potential of negative experiences, and leaves 
virtually unexplored the attractiveness and awareness rais-
ing capacity of positive logics, rooted in the established 
forms of successful environmental governance and effec-
tive forms of management and control of risks: Fair Trade 
networks and chains, City Climate Action networks, and 
private authorities around environmental standardization 
and eco-labeling raise also a transnational awareness.
Authority and environment 
In understanding the revision of the (environmen-
tal) state in the emergence of a “global assemblage”, the 
concept of authority is useful. It helps us to analyze how 
environmental authority, in the 1980s still fully belong-
ing to the (formal) public political realm and exercised by 
the nation-state, has been both transformed and relocated 
under conditions of globalization. The transformation of 
state environmental authority goes parallel to Ulrich Beck’s 
notion of the cosmopolitan state. The linking of nation-
states in transnational environmental networks, particularly 
in Europe, is increasingly seen as an inevitable strategy 
for states to remain in charge of environmental protection. 
When investigating or theorizing upon the relocation of 
public authority in the global age, most general social sci-
6 A cosmopolitan state is defined by Beck as a state which is “neutral” towards nationality and allows national identities to exist side by side (compare different 
religions existing side by side). The cosmopolitan state is supportive for transnational identities and goals, and allows “dual citizenships”. In sum, it does away with 
“the other” as organizing principle for national politics (BECK, 2005).Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, n. 17, p. 33-46, jan./jun. 2008. Editora UFPR 38
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ence scholars turn their face towards the market, also when 
reflecting on the field of environment. As globalization is 
first of all economic globalization, the shift of state envi-
ronmental authority is most likely to occur towards market 
authority, with all the critical and problematic consequences 
related to that. Most scholars (e.g. CASTELLS, 1997a; AMAN, 
2002; BECK, 2005) conclude that under conditions of glo-
balization shifting authority (i) will be mainly from the 
state towards the market, and hardly to civil society; and 
(ii) such shift should generally be perceived as of limited 
relevance for strengthening environmental authority. It is 
here that Sassen (2006) and Hall and Biersteker (2002) 
are complementary, as they (i) seem to acknowledge that 
a relocation of authority to markets is not in principal dev-
astating for social and environmental agendas, and (ii) that 
civil society can also become a locality of environmental 
authority – often labeled moral authority –, and not just 
the container of protest identities, a last resort against a 
dominant, massive and evil empire. 
This last point is more strongly emphasized within the 
environmental social science literature. The diversification 
or hybridization of environmental authority under current 
conditions of globalization is particularly relevant when it 
strengthens a private moral authority. In analyzing what they 
call the fluidization of regulatory space under globalization, 
Lipschutz and Fogel (2002, p. 122ff) identify the different 
sites of authority of non-governmental organizations in the 
ongoing privatization of environmental regulations under 
neo-liberal globalization. The monopolized environmental 
authority of the state that dominated much of the 20th cen-
tury is now spreading and diffusing and NGOs manage to 
acquire some of it, particularly with respect to deterritorial-
ized practices. In a more or less similar way, Conca (2005) 
challenges the monocultures of state authority by analyzing 
new authoritative agents in global environmental politics, 
among which NGOs, transnational advocacy networks and 
expert scientific/epistemic communities, whose authority 
is often based on knowledge and expertise, or representing 
and articulating values and moral claims. Conca (2005, p. 
193) is correct in concluding that not many have given the 
institutionalization of these new kinds of non-state author-
ity serious thought. The emphasis is on new agents and 
networks, but not so much on embedded and enduring roles 
and rules that form and give shape systematically over larger 
stretches of time. But it is remarkable that neither Lipschutz 
and Fogel nor Conca pay any serious attention to the reloca-
tion of environmental authority to the market, probably be-
cause they don’t see such non-state environmental authority 
as of much relevance for environmental safeguarding. It is 
especially the ecological modernization school-of-thought 
that has theorized and debated the shifting environmental 
authority from states to – among others – private markets, 
including the institutionalization process coming (or not 
coming) along with that (e.g. MOL, 2001).
This diversifying and shifting environmental author-
ity is especially relevant under conditions of globalization. 
The change, diversification and relocation of environmen-
tal authority away from the nation-state and the political 
sphere goes together with a deterritorialization and dena-
tionalizing of environmental authority, so much needed 
under globalization. Different forms of authority have 
“jurisdiction” over different territorial stretches. Market 
authorities might relate multiple small localities within 
multiple nation-states through production networks and 
chains. Non-state moral and epistemic authorities might 
even have more non-geographically bordering capabilities, 
and are thus further deterritorialized, as in the case of the 
digitalized worlds of NGOs, global civil society networks 
or epistemic communities.7 Thus the demonopolization and 
denationalizing of state environmental authority material-
izes through the growing importance of various forms of 
non-state environmental authorities. These non-state envi-
ronmental authorities also existed under the nation-state 
assemblage, but largely within and subsumed by a dominant 
public environmental authority. This has changed within a 
global assemblage (cf. Figure 1). 
Non-state environmental authorities 
Two decades ago production and consumption proc-
esses were basically regulated by state environmental 
authorities, who were legitimized to set standards, enforce 
and control them and as such protect national environmental 
7 Although interesting, we will be less concerned in this paper with the shift of state environmental authority to epistemic environmental authority.Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, n. 17, p. 33-46, jan./jun. 2008. Editora UFPR 39
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qualities. Under globalization, diminishing state authority, 
and environmental state failures, other non-state environ-
mental authorities have gained their place in legitimately 
ruling and regulating the environment. 
Private market authority has played for a longer time a 
role in governing private entities. But all these forms of pri-
vate authority (i) remained largely at the national level (cf. 
Figure 2) and (ii) largely remained in the area of business, 
economics and private goods and hardly entered the field 
of public goods. Private authority had only a marginal role 
with respect to environmental goods in the 1980s. Business 
associations, through private interest government, acquired 
limited authority in the field of environmental manage-
ment towards its members, among others with respect to 
environmental reporting requirements, dissemination of 
environmental information, and sometimes certification 
and labeling.8 Only after the 1992 Rio de Janeiro and the 
2002 Johannesburg summits on environment and develop-
ment, business councils, organized private interest groups 
and market arrangements started to develop several inter-
national codes of conduct, certification and labeling, envi-
ronmental partnerships, environmental services companies 
and networks, and other programs.9 These various forms of 
private environmental authority included close relations of 
trust, cooperation and legitimacy between government(s) 
and business, involving often some kind of governmental 
monitoring and accountability structures. This, however, 
becomes more problematic at the international and global 
level. Global forms of private environmental authority are 
less involved with formal organizations (and more with 
networks of organizations or institutional arrangements0, 
and function no longer with the boundaries of public envi-
ronmental authorities.
Civil society organizations have also not been absent 
in regulatory affairs, nationally (e.g. the various nature con-
servation organizations) and internationally (e.g. the Red 
Cross). But within the field of environment, their main 
concern over the last decades was to locate environmental 
authority as much as possible at the (environmental) state. 
It is only recently, under conditions of globalization and es-
pecially at the transboundary level, that these organizations 
actively aim to acquire and seize environmental authority, 
and apply and use that authority in various environmental 
coalitions and institutional arrangements with state and 
non-state actors. 
FIGURE 1 – DIVERSIFYING AND SHIFTING ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORITY UNDER GLOBALIZATION.
8 There is an interesting line of inquiry into the role of business associations in private regulation – with some attention to environmental reform – especially performed 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s (e.g. STREEK; SCHMITTER, 1985; JACEK, 1987; MARTINELLI, 1991). An immature and weak associational landscape prevented such 
private authority models to emerge in developing countries, but weak states – for instance in Africa and Bangladesh – did enable other private authority forms on 
public goods. Most of the national forms of private authority involve formal organizations, as Ronit (2001, p. 570) correctly notices.
9 The UNCTAD (1996; 2003) have provided further information and inventories of self-regulation of private actors in environmental management.Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, n. 17, p. 33-46, jan./jun. 2008. Editora UFPR 40
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I will illustrate this in two cases: (i) the relocation of 
environmental authority to private authority via certifica-
tions and labelling in (transnational) economic networks; 
and (ii) the reshaping, relocation and multiplication of en-
vironmental authority in new public-private arrangements 
and partnerships.
Labeling and certification
A field where non-state environmental authority 
has strongly emerged during the last 15 years is on en-
vironmental certifications and labeling. Although starting 
in the late 1980s nationally, environmental management 
and auditing systems for private producers have especially 
developed and spread as a new private environmental au-
thority in the 1990s, strongly enhanced by globalization 
processes. The systems have been globally standardized 
and certified. While in the early 1990s various systems of 
standardization and certification were developed in parallel 
(and in competition), towards the turn of the millennium the 
International Organization for Standardization ISO14000 
series came out as the global standard for environmental 
auditing and management systems and their certification. 
Figure 2 gives evidence of the rapid adoption of ISO 14000 
certified systems in companies around the world. These cor-
porate environmental auditing practices have moved from 
the OECD countries – mostly via transnational companies 
and the global networked economy – to domestic companies 
in industrializing societies, strongly pushed by business-to-
business relations and civil society requests for transpar-
ency and information. The International Organization for 
Standardization negotiates and designs the ISO standards 
and the certification procedures. Figure 3 provides the grow-
ing number of new ISO standards annually, giving evidence 
of growing private authority, especially globally (MATTLI; 
BÜTHE, 2003). Although membership of ISO is by country, 
usually a private national standard developing organization 
is member, and not a governmental organization. The over 
180 technical committees, 550 subcommittees and 2.000 
working groups that design the standards consist of experts 
representing industries and other groups, but – again - not 
governmental authorities nor civil society groups. Funding 
of ISO and the small secretariat (around 170 full time staff) 
is private. Industries also hardly involve governmental au-
thorities in international standard setting negotiations and 
FIGURE 2 – ISO 14001 CERTIFIED FIRMS IN DIFFERENT REGIONS OF THE WORLD, 1995-2005 (SOURCE: ISO WEBSITE).Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, n. 17, p. 33-46, jan./jun. 2008. Editora UFPR 41
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procedures (MATTLI; BÜTHE, 2003, p. 39ff), although these 
standards are often codified in regulation afterwards. 
In all, this is a private sector dominated international 
authority structure.10
A more diffuse development is happening with 
respect to green product certification and labeling. Most 
advanced industrialized states have now one or more state-
recognized and sanctioned eco-labeling programs for vari-
ous products (e.g. on organic food, wood, recycled prod-
ucts, cars, green energy etc.), and incidentally international 
state-run eco-labeling programs are being developed (e.g. in 
the European Union). But besides – and increasingly over-
whelming – these state-sanctioned and often state-organized 
eco-labels and product information schemes, a blossoming 
of private initiatives can be witnessed. From local or na-
tional producer/sector organized initiatives, to truly global 
innovative industry-NGO eco-labeling initiatives, such as 
those of the well known Forest Stewardship Council and 
Marine Stewardship Council.11 The environmental labeling 
and product certification schemes have become a world-
wide phenomenon. Various standardization organizations 
and arrangements are in place with respect to product labels. 
Some of them are indeed clear organizations, other take 
up hybrid organizational forms or are rather arrangements, 
which bring together various (business, NGO and state) 
organizations, each drawing on their own resources and 
constituencies, and thus credibility and legitimacy.
FIGURE 3 – NEW ISO/IEC STANDARDS ANNUALLY, 1986-2006 (SOURCE: ISO AND IEC ANNUAL REPORTS).
10 Not all countries have however equal influence. Developing country companies, governments, and environmental NGOs, have been only marginally involved in 
the drafting of, for example, the ISO 14000 series (KRUT; GLECKMAN, 1998; CLAPP, 2005). For instance, of the 141 developing countries, only 50 had full members of 
International Organization for Standardization ISO in the late 1990s and only 25 had (often not very active) participants in Technical Committee 207 on environmental 
management (and its various sub-committees), which deals with most environmental standards. In contrast, all developed countries have members and almost all 
were actively involved in TC 207 negotiations from its establishment in 1993 onward (cf. KRUT; GLECKMAN, 1998, p. 40-62). In 2006, some 35 developing and 
transitional economies had members in TC 207. Mattli and Büthe (2003) provide interesting data of the considerably larger influence of European members vis-à-vis 
U.S. members in the ISO. See for similar data on the Codex Alimentarius standards: Henson and Jaffee (2007).
11 A rich literature from various disciplines has emerged on the various forms, impacts, and arrangements involving public, private and mixed labeling schemes (cf. 
MAGAT; VISCUSI, 1992; OOSTERVEER, 2007). But the global labeling schemes are not always that global as they meant to be. The innovative and much celebrated MSC 
and FSC labeling schemes are developed to function globally, but in 2006 17 of the 19 certified fisheries under the MSC label and over 80% of the certified area 
under the FSC label were located in developed countries.Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, n. 17, p. 33-46, jan./jun. 2008. Editora UFPR 42
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Crucial – from an authority point of view – in these 
labeling and certification programs are not just the stand-
ardization organizations but also the private certifying and 
inspection organizations, who should make sure that labels 
and certificates represent what they claim to represent. And 
there is a wide variety among them. Established in the late 
19th century as a French grain shipment inspection house, 
SGS12 is at the moment the world leading authority in in-
spection, verification, testing and certification of products 
and processes in all sectors, with over 42.000 employees in 
a network of around 1.000 offices and laboratories around 
the world. They are also an auditor for ISO certifications. 
Control Union13 (which includes former Skal International) 
is a smaller and more targeted global network of companies, 
laboratories and certifiers in among others the food, feed 
and wood sector. Their central certification branch in the 
food and wood sector had in 2005 over 100 employees, with 
an equivalent of inspectors and certifiers in many national 
offices in numerous countries. They translate (governmental 
and non-governmental) environmental requirements into 
eco-labeling schemes, but also organize stakeholder sup-
port and influence, assess what can be and what can not be 
certified and inspected, and inspect and certify products 
(along the whole line of the value chains and the transport 
routes).14 These major certification companies do more than 
just inspecting whether standards are fulfilled; they are ac-
tively involved in developing and designing such standards, 
which make them indeed a global private authority. There 
also many smaller ones, who are less involved in standard 
setting procedures and content.
But there is more at stake here than just a simple 
relocation of environmental authority from state to market. 
First, in these labeling and certification arrangements, the 
state is never absent and environmental authority is thus 
never simply private or non-state authority. Each label, 
certificate and product-information system should be 
understood as a complex arrangement of actors designing 
the standard, organizations verifying information, routes 
for transmission of the label or information, arrangements 
and strategies to deal with uncertainty and trust, and us-
ers that are addressed with such certifications and labels. 
While some of these actors and organizations are private in 
nature (either commercial or non-profit organizations), oth-
ers are state organizations. The initially voluntary company 
systems of auditing have increasingly found base in legal 
requirements on, for instance, environmental reporting.15 
Combinations of private market, private moral and public 
authority can be also witnessed in various product labeling 
schemes, be it often with different arrangements. The point 
that needs to be made here is that these arrangements draw 
on multiple authorities (often related to multiple actors), 
be it for different cases and situations in different mixes. 
It is still rare that state authority is completely excluded in 
environmental regulation; and if so then private authority 
shows mixes of business related market authority, NGO-
based moral authority and expert and knowledge authority 
of epistemic communities. Böstom (2006) calls this the 
logic of inclusiveness in standardization organizations.
Second, these diversifying or shifting environmental 
authorities come along with a deterritorialization of author-
ity and governance, and are as such closely linked to proc-
esses of globalization. The fact that these environmental 
authorities have to work across national boundaries, in the 
global networks and flows of production and product trade, 
makes that national state authorities do no longer fit as the 
sole environmental authority. That is also not too surpris-
ing as labels and process certifications – whether based on 
environmental criteria or other – are closely bound with 
the global economy. 
Environmental partnerships
An area where such a mixing or merging of various 
environmental authorities has been most prominent is in 
so-called environmental partnerships, or partnerships for 
sustainability. In these partnerships, public environmental 
authority often partners with other sources and locations of 
authority, in order to strengthen the environmental capacity 
and power to reach set goals. Partnerships in the field of 
12 Available in: <http://sgs.com/>.
13 Available in: <http://www.controlunion.com/main/default;htm>..
14 They run various programmes such as EUREPGAP, Greengold label (on palm oil use in biomass energy production), Tesco nature’s choice, Utz kapeh coffee, 
and organic production.  
15 Denmark was the first European country with legislation on mandatory company environmental reporting in 1995 (with a revision in 2002), soon to be followed 
by the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Spain and others (HOLGAARD; JØRGENSEN, 2005).Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, n. 17, p. 33-46, jan./jun. 2008. Editora UFPR 43
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environmental and sustainability have a history of some two 
decades, but it is especially since the 1992 UNCED confer-
ence and even more after the Johannesburg summit of 2002 
that they are sky-rocketing and globalizing.16 Globalization, 
environmental state-failures and (global) governance have 
provided fertile ground for the emergence and spreading of 
so-called cross-sectoral environmental partnerships. Many 
of these partnerships still have a national outlook in that the 
partners are located within one nation-state. But then the ra-
tionale for such partnership is to be found in the complexity 
linked to globalization and the impossibilities for states to 
details and pattern the regularities for environmental gov-
ernance also within their territory. Hence, other partners, 
and with that often sources of authority are called in. But 
a major part of these new cross-sectional partnerships are 
transnational, either by the nature of their partners, and/or 
by the geographies they aim to cover (cf. BÖRZEL; RISSE, 
2005; ANDONOVA; LEVY, 2003).
Compared to labels and certifications, these environ-
mental partnerships are not necessarily strongly rooted in 
the global economy of products and production processes. 
Various recent inventories of multi-sectoral environmen-
tal partnerships illustrate that these do not dominate in 
industrial products or productions processes, but rather 
on water, nature conservation, and energy (cf. OECD, 2006; 
available in: <http://webapps01/un.org.dsd.partnerships/
public/wecome.do>). So, while some of the standardiza-
tion organizations behind labels can be interpreted as part-
nerships (as for instance illustrated by Börzel and Risse, 
2005, and Böstrom, 2006), the two categories are far from 
the same. Environmental partnerships share with labels 
and certification a shift of authority from public arrange-
ments of environmental protection towards a multiplicity 
and combination of authority sources. And they share with 
the former category an involvement of state authorities, 
rather than a full replacement of state authority by private 
authority. Most partnerships link, in a stronger or weaker 
form, state environmental authority with other sources of 
authority in developing and implementing their arrange-
ments and rules. Some scholars even claim that partnerships 
hardly have any additional regulatory capacity or authority, 
and if they develop some it is basically to strengthen the 
already powerful. Still, by their “inclusiveness” partnerships 
increase moral authority.
Yet, where the literature on certifications and envi-
ronmental labeling is in general positive in terms of the 
articulation and use of new sources of authority that make 
a difference in ruling on environmental protection, the 
evaluations on environmental partnerships are much more 
ambivalent. While it is acknowledged that the emergence 
of environmental partnership should be interpreted in terms 
of the search for new forms of environmental governance 
under globalization conditions, and some scholars are 
convinced of their future career (cf. WADDELL; KHAGRAM, 
2007), it seems that especially the national partnerships that 
function in a clear institutional structure are successful in 
gaining authority, often even at the cost of state authority. 
While the global partnerships, that lack a clear institutional 
setting or even face an institutional void such as many of the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development partnerships, 
find it much more difficult to gain or execute environmental 
authority. 
Concluding assessment
The emerging private authority in the areas of rule-
making, standard-setting and implementation, and partner-
ships should be seen in perspective. As states withdraw 
from some of their tasks and functions that we traditionally 
associate with public authorities due to globalization proc-
esses, lack of state capacity, a high level of complexity or 
a changing ideology, other actors or institutional arrange-
ments might step in and seize authority. But these forms of 
private or non-state authority are often either legitimized 
by governments or legitimacy is acquired through other 
authorities (such a moral and scientific authority). In that 
sense, we should be careful of roughly concluding that a 
change is taking place from state environmental authority 
to a market authority, and that such a process goes against 
the interest of stringent and effective environmental pro-
tection, for several reasons. First, while the conclusion of 
a diminishing state environmental authority can indeed be 
witnessed increasingly, it does not mean that private market 
16 See the data base of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (JOHANNESBURG, 2002) partnerships at:http://webapps01/un.org.dsd.partnerships/public/
wecome.do. Over 330 international partnerships had been registered through the WSSD by mid 2007.Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, n. 17, p. 33-46, jan./jun. 2008. Editora UFPR 44
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environmental authority is enhancing or gaining ground, as 
several other non-state forms of environmental authority are 
gaining ground. Second, where private market environmen-
tal authority is emerging it is often still related to and le-
gitimized by state environmental authority. Third, it proves 
also too simple to equate private market environmental 
authority with poor environmental records, as among other 
ecological modernization scholars have learnt us.
At the same time there are reasons for further critical 
inquiry into the changing environmental authority structure 
under conditions of globalization. While current shifts in 
environmental authority away from the nation-state take 
place under relatively prosperous environmental conditions, 
the question emerges whether these new environmental 
authorities hold under high consequence risks. Will envi-
ronmental state authority not move back in when serious 
environmental risks occur, such as in the case of Tsjerno-
byl, global bird flue, or severe catastrophes due to climate 
change? Or can these non-state environmental authorities 
also reverse without any environmental state authority 
back-up, and under what kind of condition might this 
happen? This all seems to be closely related to the degree 
and strength of institutionalization of these new non-state 
environmental authorities in markets, civil societies and 
science; but it also depends on the degree to which these 
non-state authorities are able to maintain their legitimacy 
and capacity as Biersteker and Hall (2002) argue, especially 
under severe challenges. For instance, will private insur-
ance structures collapse under ongoing climate catastro-
phes? Will civil society moral authorities be able to keep 
their legitimacy when they increase their power, influence 
and thus compromises in ruling environmental challenges 
though coalitions? Will the partnerships structures be able 
to overcome conflicting interest, and push for radical cli-
mate change and over-fishing mitigation? Will the moral 
authorities of environmental NGOs have enough power 
and legitimacy to ban the trade in endangered species? We 
are only starting to see the first steps of non-state environ-
mental authorities under conditions of globalization, and 
much experiences and research lies ahead for assessing their 
strengths, continuity and power.
Finally there is the question of democratic account-
ability on non-state authorities. Especially with respect to 
public agendas non-state actors are not considered norma-
tively entitled to act authoritatively, because they lack the 
political accountability to wider constituencies than just 
their members. But in an interesting contribution James 
Meadowcroft (2007) is less straight forward in rejecting 
the democratic credentials of non-state authority structures. 
Although the democratic outlooks of – in his case – part-
nerships can certainly not be taken for granted, he does 
see potentials in creating and constructing accountability 
mechanisms via the interaction between public and private 
authorities. Representation, deliberative interactions and 
accountability linkages need than become part of designing 
new environmental authority structures that are effective in 
meeting the challenges of environmental governance under 
conditions of globalization. This will only be possible in 
new interlinkages, arrangements and interdependencies be-
tween state and non-state environmental authorities. In that 
sense, the delinking and full replacement of environmental 
state authorities for non-state environmental authorities is 
both empirically limited and normatively undesired.
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